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Introduction 
Countries with the highest degree of specialisation in tourism tend to be small and 
remote, most of them being island countries (e.g. Brau et al., 2007). Four important 
consequences can be drawn from these features. First, the local tourism industry is 
highly dependent on air transport; this is why they have been a preferred choice for 
international tour-operators. Second, they are perceived by tourists as differentiated 
products, which confer them with market power.1 Third, their economic performance 
has a negligible impact on international markets. Lastly, the massive tourist arrivals to 
these small countries and the consequent tourism expansion intensify the use of 
common resources. 
In this paper we study, at a theoretical level, the effects of the so-called 
commons and anti-commons problems on the aggregate equilibrium of a tourism 
economy characterised by the aspects just described. These problems are market 
failures, so they impinge on factor allocation and welfare. Our aim is to analyse those 
effects along with the required public intervention to achieve a local optimum. The local 
optimum is not Paretian because the local government has incentives to use the market 
power of the economy in the tourism markets (e.g. Donnenfeld, 1983). 
It is pertinent to remember what is understood by the commons and anti-
commons problems. The well-known problem of the commons arises provided that the 
property rights are not clearly assigned and hence private costs underestimate social 
costs, which results in over-production. In our analysis the commons problem will 
consist of a congestion problem, and not of the tragedy of the commons.2 In addition, 
tourism goods, such as transport services and tourism goods provided at the destination, 
                                                 
1 These two implications were pointed out by Hernández-Martín (2008). Regarding the second 
implication, the empirical evidence by Prieto-Rodríguez and González-Díaz (2008) showed that there is 
an economic rent for hotels in tourism islands. 
2 The well-known tragedy of the commons is referred to the exhaustion of a common resource due to 
overuse. 
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exhibit a high degree of complementariness, so the tourism basket can be combined as a 
package. Accordingly, the tourist would care about the package price instead of each 
service price. Candela et al. (2008) were the first in using the concept of anti-commons 
to analyse tourism markets, while this concept was introduced in the field of Law and 
Economics by Michelman (1982). In their analysis of local tourism systems, Candela et 
al. (2008) showed that when these goods are produced under imperfect competition the 
anti-commons problem may emerge. This problem appears as long as there is no 
coordination among the firms in making their decisions. As a consequence, each 
industry charges its own mark-up, which leads to a higher package price and a smaller 
tourism production than if a unique mark-up was charged on the package price. 
For accomplishing our goal, we develop a two-period model that represents the 
aggregate behaviour of a tourism economy that faces exogenous tourism demands, and 
enjoys market power in its export markets.3 The framework is based on the following 
assumptions. The economy produces non-traded consumption goods and traded tourism 
services. There are two factor inputs: capital that is allocated to both sectors, and a 
common resource that is only used by the tourism sector. Capital fully depreciates at the 
end of each period, and hence in the first period it must be allocated to both sectors, 
while in the second period it is entirely allocated to producing consumption goods and 
the tourism production is nil. The revenues from the tourism exports in the first period 
pay for the imports of capital goods for the next period.4 In the tourism sector there is an 
external effect related to the industry’s production, which stands for the congestion 
problem provoked by the use intensity of the common resource. In addition, the tourists 
                                                 
3 A two-period model is enough to illustrate the ideas that we develop in this paper. Furthermore, this 
structure is quite convenient for the analysis of optimal policies, since it allows the changes in welfare to 
be easily computed (e.g. Huizinga, 1995). 
4 The positive role for economic growth of using the tourism revenues to import capital goods was 
showed, both theoretically and empirically, by Nowak et al. (2007). Moreover, the empirical evidence by 
Holzner (2005) has also revealed that the tourism countries tend to have high investment and economic 
growth. 
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need to buy transport services to reach the destination. These services are produced at 
zero cost by foreign firms that also enjoy market power. The transport and the local 
tourism services are perfect complementary, so the tourism basket can be combined as a 
package. Lastly, there is a government in the economy with the aim of maximising 
welfare of the local population. 
There is an underlying question to the presence of complementariness, namely 
how the total surplus generated by both industries is split off between the foreign and 
the local firms. The split off is critical for the tourism economy providing it impinges on 
capital allocation and the tourism revenues. The answer depends on whether firms make 
their decisions independently or jointly. Regardless the type of market arrangement, we 
show that the government’s strategy for maximising welfare is to behave as a price-
leader, in the sense of computing the local residual tourism demand and then 
maximising the social profits. The reason is quite simple: the economic rent is resource 
saving. 
In this framework we begin by studying the situation of direct selling wherein 
the local and the foreign firms make their decisions independently. Our findings reveal 
that it would become optimal to tax the local tourism price whenever the commons 
problem overcame the anti-commons problem. When the opposite applies, subsidising 
will become optimal. The next step in our analysis is to allow for the emergence of tour-
operators. The literature on industrial organisation shows that the joint maximisation of 
profits is a solution for the anti-commons problem, provided that a unique mark-up is 
charged (e.g. Andreiychencko et al., 2006). In the tourism markets this task is carried 
out by the tour-operators. They choose the package prices and productions that 
maximise the total surplus, and then the surplus is share out between the tour-operators 
and the local firms through negotiation processes. In this respect, our analysis is based 
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on the sensible assumption that only the foreign transport firms can act as tour-
operators. 
From the firms’ point of view the joint maximisation of profits would be a 
solution for the anti-commons problem, but not from the perspective of the tourism 
economy. This is because the maximisation of the total surplus does not imply the 
maximisation of profits earned by the tourism country. Moreover, the commons 
problem remains unsolved, and hence a public intervention is required in order to 
reduce the tourism production. These findings seem to suggest that the presence of a 
unique tour-operator could be a solution for the congestion problem, given that this firm 
would control the aggregate tourism production. We show that, from the tourism 
economy’s point of view, this argument is not correct. Indeed, a standard result in the 
literature on industrial organisation is that the joint maximisation of profits may imply 
that one of the goods is priced below its marginal cost. Therefore, once again a public 
intervention is needed to reduce the tourism production. 
Our last finding refers to the changes in welfare provoked by the switch from 
several tour-operators to a single one. One could think of the presence of a unique tour-
operator as being welfare improving as long as it considers the social marginal costs. 
However, we find quite the opposite, the reason lying in the effects on the local residual 
tourism demand. The local tourism price is equal to the average costs plus a proportion 
of the total surplus per production unit. Such a proportion represents the negotiation 
power of local firms. The switch increases the total surplus, thus provoking a rise in the 
local tourism price. But it also lowers the average costs, which leads to a reduction in 
the local tourism price. Under the plausible assumption that the negotiation power 
remains the same (or becomes smaller) the latter effect overcomes the former one, and a 
6 
 
contraction of the local residual tourism demand, and hence in the tourism revenues, 
takes place. The overall result is a reduction in welfare. 
The main message from this paper is that foreign tour-operators and tourism 
destinations do not have the same objectives, so their views about the solution of the 
commons and anti-commons problems differ substantially. In this respect, there are 
voices claiming for a greater involvement of international tour-operators in the 
administration of commons resources in the tourism destinations (e.g. Budeanu, 2003). 
We are not radically against that claim. What we aim is to warn on the fact that the tour-
operators care about their profits and not about welfare in the tourism destinations. The 
ones in charge of achieving the maximum welfare level should be the local 
governments. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second section describes the 
environment. The direct selling situation is studied in the third section. The emergence 
of tour-operators is discussed in the fourth section. The two subsequent sections analyse 
the situations with several tour-operators and a single tour-operator, respectively. 
Finally, the last section summarises and concludes. 
The environment 
Our simple theoretical framework represents the aggregate equilibrium of a two-period 
tourism economy that enjoys market power in the tourism markets. The time period is 
denoted as t 0,1 . The tourism destination produces a large number m  of traded 
tourism good varieties,  itx , i 1,2,...,m , and a non-traded good of consumption, tY . 
There are two factor inputs: physical capital, tK , that is used in both sectors and 
depreciates fully; and a common resource, R , that is only used by the tourism sector. In 
period 0 the revenues from tourism exports pay for the imports of capital goods for the 
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next period. Hence, in period 1 the tourism production is nil and capital is entirely 
allocated to the consumption goods sector. In every period, the country is inhabited by a 
continuum of measure one of identical households. From now on, it should be kept in 
mind that the capital goods will be taken as numeraire, and that the variables will be 
expressed in per capita terms of the tourism economy. 
The tourists come from a large number n  of origins, denoted by j 1,2,...,n . 
Moreover, they must buy transport services to reach the destination. We assume that 
transport and tourism services at the destination are perfect complementary, so the 
tourism basket can be combined as package. The transport services are supplied by 
foreign firms because the tourism economy does not have comparative advantage in the 
production of those services. 
Next, we describe the environment with detail. 
The consumption goods sector in the tourism economy 
There is a continuum of measure one of competitive firms that produce consumption 
goods with the AK technology: 
 t Y ,tY K ,  (1) 
where Y ,tK  denotes physical capital allocated to the sector. The representative firm 
chooses capital as to maximize the profits   Y ,t t t Y ,tp r 1 K    , where tp  is the 
consumption goods price, tr  is the interest rate and the depreciation rate of capital is 
equal to the unity. The maximisation of profits yields: 
 t tp r 1.   (2) 
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The demands of transport and local tourism services 
By simplicity, we assume that the tourism market is organised in independent segments 
according to tourist’ features. More specifically, each type of tourist is denoted by the 
pair  i, j , which means that she demands local tourism good i  and comes from origin 
j . Therefore, there are m n  types of tourists. The tourism basket purchased by the 
tourist of type  i, j  costs i , j0q  units of capital good: 
 i , j i , j i , j0 L,0 F ,0q q q ,   (3) 
where i , jL ,0q  denotes the price of local tourism goods and 
i , j
F ,0q  is the price of foreign 
transport services. The equation (3) implies that the transport and the local tourism 
goods are combined in a one-to-one relationship. We formulate the demands as: 
  i , j i , j i , j0 L,0 F ,0x q q , i 1,2,...,m, j 1,2,...,n, 1,       (4) 
where i , j0x  is the demanded amount of transport and local tourism services, and hence of 
tourism baskets, of type  i, j . 
The government in the tourism economy 
There is a public planner or government in the tourism economy with the objective of 
correcting the undesirable effects of commons and anti-commons problems on the 
social welfare. In doing so, it uses ad-valorem taxes/subsidies and flat transfers/taxes as 
policy instruments. More specifically, for reducing the tourism production it collects ad-
valorem taxes on the local tourism price, with tax rate 0  , and distribute the tax 
revenues among the families in the form of flat transfers, 0T 0 , in order not to 
introduce further distortions. Conversely, for increasing the tourism production it grants 
the local tourism firms with ad-valorem subsidies on the local tourism price, 0  , that 
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are financed with flat taxes paid by the households, 0T 0 . The public budget is always 
balanced: 
 
m n
i , j i , j
L ,0 0 0
i 1 j 1
q x T .
 
  (5) 
The local tourism sector 
Each firm retains monopoly power on its market segments. The firm i  sells its services 
to tourists from all origins, so it faces n  demands. The production function of firm i  is: 
   =      
m m n
i i i i , j
0 x ,0 0 0 0
i 1 i 1 j 10
Rx k , X x x , 0,
X 

  
     (6) 
where i0x  is the production of tourism good i , and 
i
x ,0k  denotes the capital devoted to 
produce it. Thus, the total capital used by the sector is equal to 
m
i
X ,0 x ,0
i 1
K k

 . The 
variable 0X  is the industry’s production, and the term 0X
  is an external effect that 
represents the use intensity of the fixed factor R . This simple formulation stands for the 
congestion problem generated by a tourism expansion, which decreases productivity 
and raises the production costs. Therefore, there are constant returns to capital at the 
firm (private) level, while the returns are decreasing at the industry (social) level. 
Taking into account the equation (6) and the public intervention, the cost function of 
firm i  becomes:5 
   ni i i , j i , j00 0 0 L,0 0
j 1
Xe r 1 x q x .
R



     (7) 
                                                 
5 In order to simplify notation, the equilibrium result of interest rate equalisation has been already 
introduced. 
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The foreign transport sector 
The transport services are produced at zero cost. We will work under two different 
assumptions. First, in each origin there is a unique provider of transport services that 
retains monopoly power in its market. Second, there is a unique monopoly that provides 
services to all origins.  
The households in the tourism economy 
The representative household derives utility from consumption and seeks to maximise 
the total discounted utility: 
  0 0 1U Ln C Ln C , 0.     (8) 
At the initial period, the representative household is endowed with 0K 0  units of 
capital, earns capital income and profits, and either receives transfers or pays taxes. The 
income is then divided into consumption expenditure and savings or capital for the next 
period. In period 1, the capital income is used to purchase consumption goods. The 
budget constraints can be then written as: 
    0 0 1 0 0 L,0 0 1 1 1 1p C K 1 r K T ,    p C 1 r K ,        (9) 
where 
m
i
L,0 L,0
i 1
 

  represents the profits from the local tourism sector. The solution 
of this problem implies that: 
  1 1 1 0 0p C 1 r p C .   (10) 
Direct selling 
We begin by analysing the direct selling situation, in which the local and the foreign 
firms make their decisions independently and sell their productions directly to the 
tourists. 
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The problems of local and foreign firms 
Considering the demands in (4), the local firm i  chooses the tourism prices as to 
maximise the sum of profits from the n  different origins: 
       i , jL ,0 j 1,2 ,...,n
n n
i i , j i , j i , j0
L ,0 L ,0 L ,0 0 0
q j 1 j 1
Xmax 1 q r 1 x ,
R

  
  
          (11) 
while the foreign firm j  decides on the transport prices as to maximise the sum of 
profits from the m  types of tourists: 
  i , jF ,0 i 1,2 ,...,m
m m
j i , j i , j i , j
F ,0 F ,0 F ,0 0
q i 1 i 1
max q x . 
  
    (12) 
The resolution of problems in (11) and (12) yields two reaction functions that show how 
the local and the foreign firms charge their own mark-up i , j0q  . The lack of 
coordination among the industries brings about the well-known problem of double 
marginalisation: 
      
i , j i , j
i , j i , j i , j i , j0 0 0 0 0 0
L,0 F ,0 0 0
r 1 X q q r 1 X 2q , q q q .
1 R 1 R
 
    
         (13) 
The tourism basket and the prices of local tourism and transport are obtained from the 
equations in (13): 
 i , j i , j i , j0 0 0 0 0 00 L,0 F ,0
r 1 X r 1 X r 1 X1 1q ,   q ,   q .
2 1 R 2 1 R 2 1 R
   
     
           (14) 
Looking at the demands in (4) and the results in (14), it follows that the equilibrium is 
symmetrical and hence the superscripts i  and j  can be removed. This feature will 
remain unchanged throughout the paper. The aggregate tourism production can be 
obtained adding up all demands defined in (4) and introducing the tourism basket price 
in (14): 
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   1 110
0
2 1X mn R .
r 1


  

      
 (15) 
Lastly, the aggregate profits earned by the local and the foreign firms can be calculated 
adding up the profits in (11) and (12) over local tourism goods and origins, respectively, 
and substituting (14) and (15): 
  
 11
11
L,00
L,0 F ,0
0
mnr 1 2 1 R ,     .
2 R r 1 1
 
     

         
 (16) 
The analysis hitherto shows that the necessary condition for the direct selling to be 
feasible is 2  . The reason lies in the double mark-up charged on the package price: 
there would be no room for a double mark-up if the price elasticity of the demand for 
tourism baskets was smaller than two. Throughout this section we will assume that the 
direct selling is workable. 
The aggregate equilibrium of the tourism economy 
Some straightforward manipulations of the equations (2), (9) and (10), (14) and (15)
yield the aggregate equilibrium conditions     110 02p 1 R mn X

 
  ,  1p 1 , 
0 0 X ,0C K K   and 1 1 L,0 0 0 0C K q X p C    from which the factor allocation and 
hence tourism production are obtained: 
 
 1DS0DS 0
X ,0
X KK .1 1R
2 1
 
  

    
 (17) 
where the superscript DS  indicates direct selling. Considering the equilibrium 
conditions and the tourism production in (17), we get the consumption levels in periods 
13 
 
0 and 1, the aggregate profits earned by the local firms and the foreign firms, and the 
local tourism price: 
     11DS DSL,0 01q mn X .   (18) 
The equation (18) is the local residual tourism demand arising after the transport firms 
have maximised their profits, which coincides with the marginal income of tourism 
baskets. 
The local optimum 
The presence of the commons and anti-commons problems might justify a public 
intervention with the aim of achieving the local optimum. This optimum is not Paretian 
because the local government has incentives to use the market power of the economy in 
the tourism markets. These incentives come from the fact that, owing to its small size, 
the resource allocation in the tourism economy has a negligible impact on the 
international markets of capital goods. Moreover, in defining the policy, the local 
planner is restricted by the tourism market structure. In this regard, the direct selling 
implies the existence of duopoly relationships with simultaneous price determination in 
each market segment. 
The objective function of the government is welfare, which comes from 
introducing the equilibrium expressions of consumption in periods 0 and 1 into the 
utility function in (8). The solution of the planner’s problem yields the optimal 
tax/subsidy rate: 
  DS
1 11   0.
1 2
    
      (19) 
Substituting DS  in (17) we obtain the optimal factor allocation and tourism production: 
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 
 
1DS
0DS 0
X ,0
X KK ,
1R
1
 
  

   

  (20) 
Here and throughout the paper the tilde will indicate values in the local optimum. From 
the equation (19) three cases can be distinguished, which rely on the relative importance 
of the commons and anti-commons problems. The conditions under which each of these 
cases emerge can be better understood by looking at the rules for maximising profits at 
an aggregate level displayed in the Figure 1. Notice that in the figure the price of the 
consumption goods is taken as given. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The aggregate tourism production when no policy is implemented, DS0X , comes 
from equalising the sum of local and foreign marginal incomes (MIFL) and the private 
marginal costs, which coincide with the average costs (AC). The price of tourism 
baskets, DS0q , is obtained substituting that production into the demand of tourism 
baskets (DTB). As we discussed before, the local tourism price, DSL,0q , becomes equal to 
the marginal income of tourism baskets (MITB). The latter result has a significant 
implication, namely the local optimum needs the maximisation of profits earned by the 
tourism economy or social profits, defined as the difference between the aggregate 
tourism revenues and the social costs, 1L,0 0 0 0q X p X R
 , where L,0q  is given by the 
demand defined in (18). Consistently, the optimal tourism production, DS0X , requires 
the equalisation of marginal income of local tourism services (MILTS) and the social 
marginal costs (SMC). The local tourism price, DSL,0q , is then obtained from the local 
residual tourism demand (MITB). 
The government follows a price-leader strategy, since it lets the foreign firms 
maximise their profits, computes the local residual tourism demand and then maximise 
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the social profits. This sequential strategy implies the existence of two mark-ups on the 
price of tourism baskets: 
     
DS
0DS DS DS
0 0 0 02
DTB MIFL MILTS MILF
X 2 1q p 1 q q .
R

  
 
   

  

 (21) 
The comparison of the equations in (13) (after setting 0   and 0 0r 1 p  ) and (21) 
shows two changes introduced by the policy regarding the mark-up charge on the price 
of tourism baskets, or total mark-up. First, it reduces the total mark-up by the amount 
2 DS
01 q  , which operates decreasing the price and increasing the tourism production; 
this is the way of dealing with the anti-commons problem. Second, the marginal cost 
considered is the social one, which raises the price and diminishes the production; this 
indicates that the congestion problem has been fixed. 
The policy depends on the relationship between the social marginal costs (SMC) 
and the marginal income of local tourism services (MILTS). Indeed, the local 
government will find optimal to reduce the tourism production whenever the direct 
selling equilibrium implies that the marginal income is smaller than the social marginal 
costs. It could be also the case that both coincide, and hence no welfare gains will be 
reached from changing the tourism production. Lastly, as illustrated in the Figure 1, the 
maximisation of welfare will entail an increase in production whenever the marginal 
income overcomes the social marginal costs. In the first case, the implementation of the 
local optimum as a decentralised equilibrium requires the introduction of an ad-valorem 
tax, DS 0  , which acts increasing the private marginal costs. In the second case no 
public policy is needed, DS 0  . Lastly, an ad-valorem subsidy, DS 0  , which reduces 
the private marginal costs (MCP in the figure), allows the optimal tourism production to 
be reached. 
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The emergence of tour-operators 
The anti-commons problem is understood as the under-production provoked by the 
absence of coordination between firms that have market power and produce 
complementary goods. From the point of view of the literature on industrial 
organisation, that is, from the firms’ perspective, the joint maximisation of profits 
allows this problem to be solved. In the tourism markets this maximisation is carried out 
by the tour-operators. Here, we will assume that the foreign transport firms act as tour-
operators, and neither the local tourism firms nor the local government can undertake 
this task. The tour-operators purchase the tourism production to the local firms, 
construct tourism packages and sell them to the tourists. We will follow the literature on 
transfer prices (e.g. Raper et al., 2000) and assume a two-step process in the 
determination of package productions and prices and the split off of the ensuing 
surpluses. In the first step the tour-operators choose the package prices and productions 
as to maximise the joint profits. Then, the total surplus is split off between the parties 
through bilateral negotiations on transfer prices or local tourism prices. The share out of 
profits relies on the negotiation power of the parties, which will be exogenously given. 
The presence of tour-operators requires the contracts to be mutually beneficial 
for the parties, in the sense that the profits earned by the tour-operators and the local 
firms should be equal to or greater than those obtained in a direct selling situation. Since 
in our framework there is an external effect associated with congestion, the emergence 
of tour-operators is not guaranteed. Therefore, before going on with the analysis, we 
must establish the necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the equilibrium with tour-
operators to exist. Such a condition is nothing but the possibility of increasing the total 
surplus by means of the joint maximisation of profits. The total profits might rise 
whenever the marginal income of tourism packages was smaller than the social 
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marginal costs. Therefore, from now on, we will assume that the next relationship 
holds:6 
        DSDS11 0DS 00 Xp1 1mn X 1      .1 R 2

    
       (22) 
This arrangement implies that the foreign firms have monopsony power in 
buying local tourism services and monopoly power in selling tourism packages. 
Additionally, every local firm acts as a monopoly in the markets of its tourism good. 
Therefore, the market structure entails bilateral monopoly-like relationships (e.g. Blair 
and Kaserman, 1987). In the next subsequent sections, we will study the case with 
several tour-operators and that with a unique tour-operator, respectively. The study of 
the latter case is pertinent as long as it implies that the tour-operator can make decisions 
on the whole tourism production and hence deal with the congestion problem. 
Several tour-operators 
Since the agents’ decisions are based on rational expectations, the local and the foreign 
firms make an accurate prediction of profits associated to any general equilibrium, and 
hence their decisions on whether or not to sign a contract turn out to be correct. 
The tour-operators’ problem and the negotiation processes 
In the first step, the foreign firm in origin j  faces m  demands of tourism packages and 
chooses m  package prices as to maximise the total profits: 
    i , j0 i 1,2 ,...,m
i , jm m
i , j i , j i , jL ,0 0 0
F ,0 0 0
q i 1 i 1
r 1 Xmax q q ,
1 1 R
   

 
              (23) 
                                                 
6 Note that      DSDS11 0DS DS 0L,0 0 Xp1 1q mn X 2 1 R

   
     . 
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where the local profits have been adjusted to account for the public policy. Notice that 
the foreign firm pays a price i , jL ,0q , and consequently the local firm receives a part 
 i , jL ,0 1   of the total surplus that corresponds to the market segment  i, j . 
Moreover, the number of tour-operators is large enough so none of them knows how its 
decisions affect the aggregate production. Consequently, the external effect 0X
  is taken 
as given. The solution of the n  problems defined by (23) yields the package price: 
     
i , j
i , j i , j0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
r 1 X q r 1 Xq q q .
1 R 1 1 R
 
   
         (24) 
The equation (24) shows that a unique mark-up is charged. Using the package price in 
(24), the aggregate tourism production can be computed by proceeding as in the 
previous section: 
   1 110
0
1 1X mn R .
r 1


  

      
 (25) 
Once the package prices and productions have been determined, a number m n  
of bilateral negotiations take place in the second step to split off the total surplus 
generated. More specifically, the tour-operator and the local firm negotiate on the local 
tourism price (transfer price) i , jL ,0q  as to maximise the utility from the agreement, 
i , j
0V : 
    i , j
L ,0
1i , j i , j i , j i , j i , j0
0 L,0 0 0 L,0 0
q
r 1max  V q X q q x ,   0,1 ,
1
  
        (26) 
where the parameters   and 1   represent the negotiation power of local and foreign 
firms, respectively. This maximisation problem is subject to the restrictions that the 
parties obtain at least the same profits as in the direct selling equilibrium. To this 
respect, when the direct selling is feasible the firms realise the government incentives 
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for implementing an optimal policy, so they consider as alternative profits those linked 
to the local optimum. 
Under the assumption that the conditions for a general equilibrium with tour-
operators are satisfied, the local tourism prices would become: 
 i , j 0 0L,0
r 1 Xq 1 ,
1 1 R

 
       (27) 
and, consequently, the total surplus expressed in aggregate terms, TS0 : 
 
1
TS L,0 0 0
0 F ,0
r 1 X1 ,
1 1 1 R
   
      (28) 
would be share out between the local and the foreign firms according to their 
negotiation power, that is,   TSL,0 01      and   TSF ,0 01    . This split off 
will remain unchanged in the case that we will analyse in the next section. 
The aggregate equilibrium of the tourism economy 
Using (2), (9) and (10), (25) and (27), we obtain the same equilibrium conditions as in 
the previous section, except for the relative price of consumption in period 0, 
    110 01p 1 R mn X

 
  . These conditions allow the factor allocation and 
hence the tourism production to be obtained: 
 
 1STO0STO 0
X ,0
X KK ,
1R 1
1 1
 
  

       
 (29) 
where the superscript STO  denotes the presence of several tour-operators. Considering 
the tourism production in (29), the local tourism price becomes equal to: 
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     11STO STOL,0 01q 1 mn X .1          (30) 
Similarly to the case of direct selling, the equation (30) is the local residual tourism 
demand. This demand is above the marginal income of tourism packages whenever 
0  , while in the direct selling situation it coincided with that marginal income. The 
reason for this result is quite obvious: the production of tourism packages is obtained by 
equalising the marginal income of tourism packages and the private marginal costs 
(average costs). Therefore, in order for the local firms to earn positive profits the local 
tourism price must forcedly be above the marginal income of tourism packages. 
The local optimum 
The solution of the planner’s problem yields the optimal tax rate: 
    STO
11 1 0,1 .
1 1
    
          (31) 
The introduction of (31) into (29) shows that the optimal tourism production, STO0X , 
coincides with that in (20). As a consequence, if a direct selling situation was feasible 
and the firms took as alternative profits those associated to the local optimum, then no 
contract would be signed and the direct selling situation would prevail. Indeed, the 
comparison between the total surplus generated by the tour-operators and that in the 
alternative situation reveals that former is smaller than the later. Consistently, in the 
remaining of this section we will assume that the direct selling is unfeasible, so there are 
tour-operators in the economy. 
The Figure 2, which displays the strategy for maximising profits at the aggregate 
level, illustrates the findings. With no policy the aggregate tourism production, STO0X , is 
obtained by equalising the marginal income of tourism packages (MITP) and the private 
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marginal costs or average costs (AC). The package price and the local tourism price, 
STO
0q  and 
STO
L,0q , come from substituting that production in the demand of tourism 
packages (DTP) and the local residual tourism demand (LRTD), respectively. Provided 
that the problem of the commons remains, the agreements between the foreign and the 
local firms do not guarantee that the local tourism price is greater than or equal to the 
social marginal costs (SMC). To this respect, the figure depicts an example of the local 
tourism price being smaller than the social marginal costs. A public intervention is then 
needed with the aim of maximising social welfare. For achieving this objective, the 
local government considers the local residual tourism demand in (30) and maximise the 
social profits. Therefore, the optimal tourism production, STO0X , requires the 
equalisation of the marginal income of local tourism services (MILTS) and the social 
marginal costs (SMC). 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The existence of several tour-operators always leads to over-production of 
tourism services. The expression of the total mark-up implied by the local optimum 
seeds light on this result: 
       
STO STO STO
0STO 0 0
0 0
DTP MITP MITP MILTS
X q q1q p 1 1 .
R
    
 
    
  

 (32) 
The comparison between the mark-up in (24) (after setting 0   and 0 0r 1 p  ) and 
that in (32) reveals that the sequential strategy of the government adds up a second 
mark-up, which is equal to the difference between the marginal income of tourism 
packages and that of local tourism services. This double margin operates raising the 
package price and reducing the tourism production. Moreover, to consider the social 
marginal costs instead of the private marginal costs operates in the same direction. 
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Accordingly, the implementation of the local optimum as a decentralised equilibrium 
requires taxing the local tourism price, which works increasing the private marginal 
costs (ACP). 
A single tour-operator 
Before carrying out the analysis, it should be noticed that the aggregate results from the 
direct selling situation with a unique foreign firm coincide with those in the third 
section. 
The tour-operator’ problem and the negotiation processes 
In the first step of the process the tour-operator chooses a number m n  of package 
prices as to maximise the total profits: 
      i , j0 i 1,2 ,...,m;
j 1,2 ,...,n
1i , jm n m n m n1i , j i , j i , jL ,0 0
F ,0 0 0
q i 1 j 1 i 1 j 1 i 1 j 1
r 1 1max q q ,
1 1 R

   

 
     
                (33) 
where the external effect 0X
  has been internalised. The solution of the problem yields 
the package price: 
        i , ji , j i , j0 0 0 0 00 0 0 1r 1 X q r 1 Xq 1 q q ,1 R 1 1 R
     
          (34) 
which incorporates a unique mark-up besides the social marginal costs. The aggregate 
tourism production can be then computed using the package price in (34): 
    
11
1
0
0
1 1X mn R .
1 r 1


   


       
 (35) 
In the second step, a number m n  of bilateral negotiations take place to split 
off the total surplus generated. More specifically, the tour-operator and each local firm 
negotiate on the local tourism price, i , jL ,0q , as to maximise the utility from the agreement: 
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  i , j
L ,0
1i , j i , j i , j i , j i , j0 0
0 L,0 0 L,0 0
q
r 1 Xmax  V q q q x ,
1 R
 

     
 (36) 
subject to the restrictions that they obtain at least the same profits as in the direct selling 
optimum. Assuming that the conditions for a general equilibrium with a single tour-
operator are satisfied, the local tourism prices can be written as: 
 i , j 0 0L,0
r 1 X1q 1 ,
1 1 R
  
       (37) 
and, consequently, the total surplus expressed in aggregate terms becomes: 
 
1
L,0 0 0
F ,0
r 1 X1 .
1 1 1 R
   
     (38) 
The aggregate equilibrium of the tourism economy 
Some manipulations of (2), (9) and (10), (35) and (37) yield the same equilibrium 
conditions as in the previous section, except for      
11
0 0
1p 1 R mn X
1

  
  . 
From these conditions we obtain the capital allocation and the aggregate tourism 
production: 
 
 1TO0TO 0
X ,0
X KK ,
1 1R 1
1 1
 
  

       
 (39) 
where the superscript TO  indicates the presence of a unique tour operator. Considering 
the tourism production in (39), the local tourism price can be written as: 
     11TO TOL,0 0
11 11q mn X .
1

 
 

    (40) 
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Provided that     1 1      , the local residual tourism demand in (40) can be 
located below or above the marginal income of tourism packages, or coincide with it. 
To this respect, it is worth noting that the aggregate tourism production is obtained by 
equalising the marginal income of tourism packages and the social marginal costs. 
Therefore, the local firms could earn positive profits even if the local tourism price was 
equal to or lower than the marginal income of tourism packages. 
The local optimum 
The solution of the planner’s problem yields the optimal tax rate: 
    TO
1 11 1 0,1 .
1 1
    
          (41) 
Considering (41) and (39) it follows that the optimal tourism production, TO0X , is equal 
to that in (20). Accordingly, if a direct selling situation was feasible, then no contract 
would be signed. Indeed, for the total surplus to be greater than in the alternative 
situation it should hold that  1 2   , which is in contradiction with the condition 
(22). Thus, in the remaining of this section we will assume that the direct selling is 
unfeasible, so there is a single tour-operator in the economy. 
The Figure 3 illustrates the strategy for maximising profits at the aggregate 
level. With no policy the aggregate tourism production, TO0X , comes from equalising 
the marginal income of tourism packages (MITP) and the social marginal costs (SMC). 
Therefore, this arrangement leads to the maximum total surplus. The package price, 
TO
0q , and the local tourism price, 
TO
L,0q , are then obtained by substituting that production 
in the demand for tourism packages (DTP) and the local residual tourism demand 
(LRTD), respectively. 
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Since there is a unique tour-operator that charges a unique mark-up and makes 
their decisions taking into account the social marginal costs, one might think that the 
problems of commons and anti-commons have been fixed. This argument would be 
correct from the tour-operator’s point of view, since it yields the maximum total 
surplus. However, this is far from being true from the tourism economy’s perspective. 
This arrangement does not guarantee that the local tourism price is equal to or greater 
than the social marginal costs. Even though this price was higher than the marginal 
costs, as in the Figure 3, the tourism economy would not be earning the maximum 
profits. Therefore, a public intervention would be justified in order to maximise the 
local welfare. For achieving this objective, the local government considers the local 
residual tourism demand and maximise the social profits. The optimal tourism 
production, TO0X , requires the equalisation of the marginal income of local tourism 
services (MILTS) and the social marginal costs (SMC). This result tells us that the 
existence of a single tour-operator always leads to tourism over-production. The 
comparison between the expressions for the total mark-up implied by the local 
optimum: 
    

 
TO TO TO
0TO 0 0
0 0
DTP MITP MITP MILTS
X q q1 1q p 1 1 ,
R 1
      
 
      
  

 (42) 
and that in (34) (after setting 0   and 0 0r 1 p  ) indicates that the government adds 
up a second mark-up, which raises the package price and reduces the tourism 
production. Accordingly, the implementation of the local optimum as a decentralised 
equilibrium requires taxing the local tourism price, which increases both the average 
and the social marginal costs (ACP and SMCP, respectively). Under the policy, the 
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tour-operator equalises the social marginal costs associated to the policy (SMCP) and 
the marginal income of tourism packages (TPMI) to obtain the package production. 
The Figure 4 shows our last result, which is referred to welfare changes 
provoked by the switch from several tour-operators to a single one. The figure depicts 
the frontiers of consumption possibilities, which are constructed using the equilibrium 
conditions 10 0 0C K X R
   and 1 L,0 0C q X , and the social indifference curves 
associated to the local optimum, 0U0 1C e C
  . 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
One could think of the existence of a single tour-operator as being positive for 
welfare of the tourism economy, as long as it can internalise the external effect linked to 
congestion. The Figure 4 shows that this is not the case. On the contrary, no matter 
whether or not a public policy is implemented, the welfare level turns out to be lower 
with a single tour-operator than with several ones. The explanation can be found 
looking at the rewritten expressions of the local residual tourism demands in (30) and 
(40): 
 
   
       
1 11 1
L,0 0 0
Average Cost Total Surplus Production
1 11 1
L,0 0 0
Average Cost Total Surplus P
1Several tour-operators   q mn X mn X ,
1 1One tour-operator   q mn X mn X
1 1
  
  
 
 
    
 
 
  
    
 

roduction
.

 (43) 
As long as  0,1 , the demand with a unique tour-operator lays below the one arising 
with several tour-operators. The transfer price is calculated as the sum of the average 
costs and the proportion   of the total surplus per production unit. The switch from 
several tour-operators to a single one reduces the tourism production, which decreases 
the average cost and increases the total surplus per production unity. The former effect 
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turns out to be stronger than the latter one, so a reduction in the tourism price occurs.7 
As shown in the Figure 6, the reduction of the local residual tourism demand provokes a 
contraction of the consumption possibilities frontier: 
 
 
 
 
   
 
1
1 1
0 0 1
1
11
0 0 1
1Several tour-operators   C K mn C ,
R 1
11One tour-operator   C K mn C ,
R 1 1
 


 



 
 
  




       
         
 (44) 
which inevitably leads to a lessening in welfare. This striking result is due to the fact 
that the government can control the local tourism costs, but not the local residual 
tourism demand implied by the prevailing market structure. 
Conclusion 
It seems difficult to argue against the existence of the so-called commons and anti-
commons problems in countries with the highest specialisation in tourism. The former 
and the latter problems lead to tourism over- and under-production, respectively. Their 
effects are not confined to the tourism sector, but they impinge on the resource 
allocation of the entire economy and hence on welfare. A public policy might be then 
necessary to maximise welfare of the local population. Consequently, the study of these 
impacts and policy implications requires a general equilibrium approach. 
Since the foreign transport services and the local tourism goods are 
complementary, they can be combined as a package, and hence the direct selling and the 
presence of foreign tour-operators emerge as possibilities. In this respect, we have 
highlighted the underlying distributive problem generated by the complementariness 
and the type of arrangements in the tourism markets. We have shown that, regardless of 
                                                 
7 It could be argued that there is no reason for thinking of the negotiation power of the parties as being the 
same in both cases. Though this seems a reasonable objection, it is also sensible to think of   value as 
being smaller when a unique tour-operator exists, which would reinforce our results. 
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the type of arrangement, reaching the maximum welfare entails a price-leader strategy 
of the local government. We have obtained four main results. First, in the direct selling 
situation the optimal policy depends on the relative importance of the problems. 
Second, the presence of either one or several tour-operators does not solve the anti-
commons problem provided it always leads to tourism over-production. Third, the 
existence of a unique tour-operator does not solve the congestion problem. Lastly, under 
sensible assumptions, the switch from several tour-operators to a single one turns to be 
welfare reducing. 
A main conclusion emerges from our study. The tour-operators seek to 
maximise profits and not welfare of the tourism destination. Consequently, their view 
about the solution of the commons and anti-commons problems differs greatly from the 
tourism destinations’. Then, the government at the destination should not leave the 
solution of these problems in the tour-operators’ hands. Despite the simplicity of our 
theoretical framework, this seems a quite general conclusion. Though we cannot discard 
the possibility that the discrepancy in objectives led to coincident outcomes, this would 
appear to be a particular, instead of general, case. Notwithstanding, we recognise that 
further research is needed for a better understanding of this subject. To this respect, 
aspects as the competition among different tourism destinations and the tragedy of the 
commons would certainly affect the tour-operators’ strategy and the policy decisions. 
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Figure 1: The profit-maximising strategy with direct selling: subsidy 
 
Notes: The aggregate social costs considered by the local planner is 10 0 0E p X
 . The curves in the 
figure are defined as follows: 
Social marginal most (SMC):  0 0 0
0
E
p 1 X
X
    
Average cost and private marginal cost (AC): 0 0 0
0
E
p X
X
  
Average cost and private marginal cost under the policy (ACP): 0 0 0 0DS DS
E X p X
1 1

    
Demand of tourism baskets (DTB):   110 0q mn X    
Marginal income of tourism baskets (MITB): 
    110 0 L,0 0
0
q X 1q mn X
X

    
Marginal income of local tourism services (MILTS): 
   2 11L,0 0 0
0
q X 1 mn X
X

        
Sum of local and foreign marginal incomes (MIFL): 
      11L,0 0 F ,0 0 0
0 0
q X q X 2 mn X
X X

      
32 
 
 
Figure 2: The profit-maximising strategy with several tour-operators 
 
Notes: The curves are defined as in the Figure 1, except for: 
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Figure 3: The profit-maximising strategy with a single tour-operator 
 
Notes: The curves are the same as in the Figure 2, except for: 
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Figure 4: One tour-operator versus several tour-operators, and the welfare 
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